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child for a parent, a parent for a child or for other persons not
in a spousal relationship.
It may be helpful to include provisions in a discretionary
trust.
•  Stating that the trust's purpose is to provide assistance
to the beneficiary in addition to any public assistance
benefits including, but not limited to, Medicaid.
•  Prohibiting the beneficiary from demanding either the
trust corpus or income, leaving distributions to trustee
discretion.
•  Limiting the amount of trust income disbursed to the
beneficiary to an amount less than the applicable income
eligibility limit.
•  Avoiding limits on the trustee's discretion.18
Ethical question.  A major concern with any effort
to qualify deliberately for Medicaid benefits under Title XIX
is the ethical aspect.  The program was never intended to
provide universal benefits to everyone.  Even for transfers
more than 30 months before making application for benefits,
individuals should consider carefully whether they can live
with the ethical implications of such moves.
FOOTNOTES
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"Estate Planning for the Elderly and
Disabled: Organizing the Estate to
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Care Assistance," 24 Ind. L. Rev.
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2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
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1 0 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(1),(2).
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1 3 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A).
1 4 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C).
1 5 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C),(D).
See, e.g., Yeates v. D'Elia, 76
A.D.2d 885, 428 N.Y.S.2d 714
(1980) (sufficient evidence
introduced to rebut presumption that
transfer of $4200 in assets within
one year of application was for
purpose of qualifying for medical
assistance.
1 6 See Lineback v. Stout, 79 N.C.
App. 292, 339 S.E.2d 103 (1986).
1 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(1).
1 8 See McEowen and Harl, supra note
1 at 1420–1421.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE.  The defendants' land included a portion
divided from the plaintiff's land by a fence constructed
several feet onto the plaintiff's land.  The defendants'
predecessor purchased the land in 1944 with the fence already
built on its present location and the evidence showed that
the fence was in existence until at least 1979.  The plaintiff
claimed that the predecessor acknowledged in 1961 that the
fence was built on the plaintiff's property but the court held
that the acknowledgement was ineffective to interrupt the
adverse possession where the fence was not moved and the
plaintiff was not given possession of the disputed area.
Livingston v. Unopened Succession of Dixon ,
589 So.2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
ANIMALS
HORSES .  The plaintiff, an attorney, was injured
when thrown off a horse while taking riding lessons at the
defendant's stables.  Before taking the lessons, the plaintiff
signed a release of the defendant's liability for injuries
suffered by the plaintiff during the riding lessons.  The
plaintiff sought to avoid the release as against public policy
and because the defendant stated that the release "didn't mean
anything."  The court held that there was insufficient public
interest or policy in horse riding to make such releases
voidable and that the plaintiff's reliance, as an attorney, on a
lay person's representation as to the legal effect of the
release was unreasonable.  Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal .
Rptr.2d 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
BANKRUPTCY REFORM BILL
The Bankruptcy Reform Bill, S. 1985, has been
introduced in the U.S. Senate which would extend the
expiration date of Chapter 12 to October 1, 1995; create an
temporary small business chapter; make technical and
inflation adjustments; and create a National Bankruptcy
Review Commission to recommend future changes in
bankruptcy law.
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtor sought to avoid
under Section 522(f) non-possessory, nonpurchase money
liens against exempt household goods.  The trustee argued
that under the Texas exemption statute, Tex. Prop. Code §
42.001(a), encumbered property is not eligible for an
exemption; therefore, the liens could not be avoided.  The
court held that federal law controlled for purposes of
determining the avoidance of liens and the liens were
avoidable.  In re  Kelly, 133 B.R. 811 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS.
AUTOMOBILE.  The debtors, husband and wife, filed a
joint Chapter 7 case and each claimed a $4,000 exemption
in their jointly owned automobile under N.M. Stat. § 42-
10-1.  The court held that since each debtor was allowed a
separate set of exemptions, the debtors could stack their
exemptions in one automobile.  In re  Jones, 134 B . R .
431 (D. N.M. 1991).
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HOMESTEAD.  The debtor claimed an exemption for
160 acres of farm land.  Prior to filing Chapter 12
bankruptcy, the debtor owned a residence in a nearby city
but slept in a mobile home, owned by the debtor's son, on
the land.  The debtor presented evidence of attempts to
purchase the mobile home or buy a new one.  The court
held that the debtor presented sufficient evidence of intent to
establish a residence on the land at the time of filing.  In re
Snook, 134 B.R. 424 (D. Kan. 1991).
HOUSEHOLD GOODS.  The debtor was allowed an
exemption as household goods for a television, cassette
recorder and lawn mower, but no exemption was allowed for
a second television, a stereo, fishing and sports equipment,
bicycle, video games, home computer and table saw.  In re
Davis, 134 B.R. 34 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991).
LIFE INSURANCE.  The debtor claimed, under Ohio
Rev. Code § 3911.10, the value of a life insurance policy
which had the debtor's mother as beneficiary.  The court held
that the life insurance policy was not exempt where the
debtor's mother was not dependent upon the debtor.  In re
Brown, 133 B.R. 860 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
OBJECTIONS.  A creditor filed an objection to the
debtor's exemption over 30 days after the deadline for filing
objection under Bankr. Rule 4003.  The court held that the
late objection would not be allowed, whether or not the
exemption had a statutory basis.  In re  Napier, 1 3 4
B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1991).
RETIREMENT PLANS.  The debtor claimed an
exemption for an employer-sponsored retirement plan and a
401(k) plan under Mass. G.L. c. 235, § 34A (1990) and the
trustee objected, arguing that the debtor could exempt only
one of the plans.  The court held that the statute allowed
exemption for more than one plan.  In re  DeVoe, 1 3 4
B.R. 74 (Bankr. D. Mass 1991).
The debtor owned an interest in a pension plan offered by
the debtor's wholly-owned corporation.  The lower courts
held that the pension plan was not a spendthrift trust
because the corporate identity would be disregarded such that
the debtor was the settlor of the fund.  The lower courts also
held that the debtor's interests in a Keogh plan and IRA were
not exempt because they were not necessary for the debtor's
support, considering the income from the debtor and the
debtor's nondebtor spouse.  The appellate court reversed on
the legal point that the pension plan was not a spendthrift
trust and held that restrictions on the pension plan would
remove the plan from the estate.  However, the court upheld
the result to the extent that the debtor was no longer
restricted in obtaining funds from the plan and had removed
funds from the plan.  Matter of Velis, 949 F.2d 7 8
(3d Cir. 1991), aff'g in part and rev'g in part ,
123 B.R. 497 (D. N.J. 1991), aff'g , 109 B . R .
64 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1989).
The debtor's claimed exemption in an IRA was allowed
because the Oklahoma exemption statute was not pre-
empted by ERISA.  In re  Pryor, 134 B.R. 2 8
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1991).
MARSHALLING.  The debtor owned a vineyard and
duplex subject to a secured lien held by a bank.  The
vineyard was also subject to a junior lien.  The junior lien
holder entered into an agreement with the bank to have the
bank seek satisfaction of its lien first from the duplex so
that sufficient equity remained in the vineyard to satisfy
most of the junior lien but leaving no equity for the debtor
in either property.  The bank sought relief from the
automatic stay, arguing that the debtor had no equity in the
two properties.  The debtor argued that under the
marshalling doctrine, the bank should have been required to
seek satisfaction of its lien from the vineyard first, leaving
equity in the duplex for the debtor.  The court held that
where the debtor and junior creditor had conflicting interests
in marshalling of assets, the senior creditor's choice
prevailed and the bank was allowed relief from the automatic
stay given its choice to satisfy its lien against the duplex
first.  In re  Teresi, 134 B.R. 392 (Bankr. E . D .
Cal. 1991).
The plaintiff was the former spouse of the debtor and
held a junior security interest in the proceeds of the sale of
the debtor's farm machinery.  A bank held a senior security
interest in the farm machinery and the proceeds from several
grain sales.  The plaintiff sought marshalling of the bank's
claims against the grain proceeds first to allow the plaintiff
some recovery on the lien against the farm machinery.  The
court held that the marshaling would be ordered to protect
the plaintiff's junior lien.  In re  Murdock, 134 B . R .
417 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991).
TRUSTEE POWERS.  Over a year prior to filing
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor transferred the debtor's
stock in a corporation to the debtor's spouse.  The trustee
successfully challenged the stock transfer as a fraudulent
transfer and the stock became estate property.  The Chapter
7 trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the spouse and
corporation seeking to subject the corporation assets to
bankruptcy claims by a "reverse piercing of the corporate
veil" under which the corporate entity would be disregarded.
The court held that although trustees had no statutory power
to bring such an action, the trustee as a shareholder of the
stock recovered into the bankruptcy estate had the power to
bring the action. In re  Schuster, 132 B.R. 6 0 4
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
  CHAPTER 7  
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The Chapter 7 debtor sought
to avoid under Section 506(d) an undersecured judgment lien
against real property which had been abandoned by the
trustee.  The court held that the lien could not be avoided
because the estate no longer had any interest in the property.
Hargrove v. Edwards Co., 133 B.R. 765 (E .D.
Va. 1991).
  CHAPTER 12  
DISCHARGE.  After the Chapter 12 debtors had
completed payments under their plan, except for payments
to secured creditors, and had filed for discharge, a creditor
filed an objection to the discharge, alleging that the debtors
had not reported or paid all their disposable income received
during the plan.  The debtors argued that the creditor had no
authority or right to raise such an objection after plan
payments had been made and discharge was requested.  The
court held that a creditor has the standing to object to a
discharge based upon the debtor's failure to make all
payments under the plan, including disposable income.
Matter of Roberts, 133 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. N . D .
Ind. 1991).
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TRUSTEE FEES .  The Chapter 12 debtor's plan
provided for direct payments of all secured claims, real estate
tax claims and attorney's fees.  Because unsecured creditors
would receive payments only if the debtor had disposable
income, the trustee would not receive any fee unless
disposable income was earned by the debtor.  The court held
that the secured claims could be paid directly to the creditors
without the trustee fee but that the real estate taxes and
attorney's fees were to be paid through the trustee.  The
court left open the question of whether the trustee would
receive adequate compensation under the plan and allowed
the trustee to petition for additional fees.  In re  Beard,
134 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
  CHAPTER 13  
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The IRS held a perfected lien
against the debtor's property and argued that the lien attached
to the debtor's nonexempt funds in a bank account and a
referral fee received after the bankruptcy filing.  The debtor
sought to avoid the lien under Section 545.  The court held
that a Chapter 13 debtor has no power to avoid statutory
liens against nonexempt property.  In re  Henderson,
133 B.R. 813 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
ELIGIBILITY.  When the debtors filed their Chapter
13 case, the schedules listed an unsecured debt owed to the
IRS of zero, although the IRS had notified the debtors of a
proposed assessment of $650,000 for deficiencies resulting
from the debtors' corporation.  The IRS did not file a claim
in the case and did not object to the debtors' plan which
provided for 100 percent payment of all allowed unsecured
claims.  Eight months after confirmation of the plan, the
debtors were granted a discharge.  The debtors filed the
instant action to determine that the tax claims were
discharged.  The IRS objected and asserted for the first time
that the tax claim made the debtors ineligible for Chapter
13.  The court held that the IRS's failure to file a claim or
object to the plan until after discharge barred the IRS from
asserting the claim and from objecting to the debtors'
eligibility for Chapter 13.  Therefore, the taxes were
discharged.  In re  Jones, 134 B.R. 274 (N.D. I l l .
1991), aff'g , 129 B.R. 1003 (Bankr. N.D. I l l .
1991) .
Although the debtors listed the FmHA as a creditor with
a secured claim of $270,000 and an unsecured claim of
$15,000, the debtors' plan treated the FmHA claim as
secured only for $113,000 and unsecured as to the remainder.
The court held that such inconsistency proved that the
amount of unsecured claims, including the undersecured
portion of secured claims, exceeded the eligibility amount
for Chapter 13 and the debtors were required to either convert
or dismiss the case.  In re  Mason, 133 B.R. 8 7 7
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  The court held
that post-petition withholding taxes and interest incurred by
the debtor-in-possession were entitled to priority as
administrative expenses.  In re Lunsford, 134 B.R. 46
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
AUTOMATIC STAY.  The debtors sought sanctions
against the IRS for violation of the automatic stay for setoff
of income tax refunds after the filing for bankruptcy.  The
IRS agent testified that the refunds were not setoff but were
delayed by the manual processing of the debtors' returns due
to the bankruptcy filing.  The court held that the delayed
refunds were not a violation of the automatic stay.  In re
Price, 134 B.R. 313 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
During the pendency of the debtor's Chapter 11 case, the
IRS assessed the debtor as a responsible person for the tax
penalty under I.R.C. § 6672 for failure of the debtor's
corporation to pay withholding taxes.  The court held that
the assessment violated the automatic stay and was void.
Olson v. U.S., 133 B.R. 1016 (D. Neb. 1991) ,
aff'g , 101 B.R. 128 and 101 B.R. 134 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1989).
CLAIMS.  After the debtor's Chapter 13 plan had been
confirmed, the IRS filed an amended claim increasing the
income tax liability for an allowed claim.  The IRS argued
that the amended claim automatically increased the allowed
claim for the taxes.  The court held that although the
amended claim may have been considered a timely claim, the
amended claim did not become an allowed claim without a
motion to reconsider the original claim or other adjudication
to include the amended claim as an allowed claim.  Matter
of Carr, 134 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1991).
The IRS held a secured claim for taxes, penalties and
interest and asserted that the claim was oversecured in that
the tax lien was secured by the debtor's unencumbered assets
and the debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan.
The debtor argued that the spendthrift provisions of ERISA
removed the pension plan from the estate and, under Section
506, the IRS claim could not attach to property which was
not part of the estate.  The court held that under I.R.C. §
6321, the tax lien attached to all property of the debtor,
including ERISA pension plans and that even under Section
506, the estate had sufficient interest in the pension plan for
the claim to attach to the plan.  In re  Perkins, 1 3 4
B.R. 408 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991).
The debtors had listed the IRS as a priority creditor with
a claim of $75 and the IRS received notice of the bankruptcy
filing.  After the bar date for filing claims, the IRS notified
the debtors of additional assessments totaling over $10,000
and the debtors sought to amend the IRS claim for that
amount.  The court held that because the denial of the claim
would harm the debtors and not the IRS, because the taxes
were nondischargeable, and because the lateness of the claim
was not the fault of the debtors, the late claim would be
allowed.  In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 134 B.R.
4 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
CAPITAL EXPENSES .  The taxpayer corporation
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy for the purpose of settling
tort claims which arose out of the corporation's business and
the corporation claimed all legal, accounting and consulting
expenses from the bankruptcy as currently deductible
expenses under I.R.C. § 162(a).  The taxpayer argued that
the "origin of the claim" doctrine applied to make all the
bankruptcy expenses currently deductible because the
expenses were incurred as a result of the tort claims.  The
IRS ruled that the expenses must be allocated between the
expenses which related to the tort claims and expenses
relating to the bankruptcy reorganization. Ltr. R u l .
9204001, May 13, 1991.
A Chapter 11 debtor corporation was required to
capitalize professional fees and expenses relating to
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           37
operating the business during the bankruptcy proceeding
where the corporation failed to segregate the expenses
between the operation of the business and the reorganization
in bankruptcy.  In re Placid Oil Co., 92-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,049 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
DISCHARGE.  The debtor failed to file returns for
1979, 1980 and 1981 and the IRS filed substitute returns
which were not signed by the debtor.  The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy more than three years after the
substitute returns were filed and sought discharge of the
taxes and penalties.  The court held that the taxes were not
dischargeable because the debtor did not file returns for the
taxes but that the penalties were dischargeable. In re
Bergstrom, 949 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1991).
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor voluntarily
took a reduction in salary to the minimum wage so that the
IRS would not be able to levy against the wages for
otherwise dischargeable taxes.  At the same time, the debtor
received loans from the employer, a corporation in which
the debtor owned an 80 percent interest.  The court held that
the taxes were not dischargeable because the debtor
attempted to evade payment of the taxes by fraudulently
decreasing the wages.  In re  Sells, 92-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,070 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
RETURNS.  The debtor claimed to have filled out and
mailed income tax returns for several taxable years for which
the IRS had filed claims.  The court held that where the IRS
claimed to have not received the returns, the debtor's
testimony as to having mailed the returns was insufficient
evidence that the returns were filed.  In re  Bicoastal
Corp., 134 B.R. 50 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
The debtor claimed to have filled out and mailed income
tax returns for a taxable year for which the IRS filed a
claim.  The court held that where the IRS claimed to have
not received the returns, the debtor's testimony as to having
mailed the returns was insufficient evidence that the returns
were filed.  In re Clark, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,066 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991).
SETOFF.  The debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in
April 1991 and listed the IRS as an unsecured creditor for
1986 taxes.  The notice to the IRS was incorrect and the
IRS did not receive notice of the filing until after the IRS
had applied the debtor's 1990 tax refund against the 1986
liability, in violation of the automatic stay.  The debtor
claimed the tax refund as an exemption.  The IRS moved for
relief from the automatic stay to validate the offset.  The
court held that Section 552(c), preventing use of exempt
assets to satisfy pre-petition debts, precluded the IRS right
of setoff under Section 553 where the tax liability was
dischargeable and unsecured.  In re  Miel, 134 B . R .
229 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991).
Within 90 days prior to the debtors' filing for
bankruptcy, the IRS offset their income tax refund for the
prior taxable year against the debtors' student loan debts held
by the Department of Education.  The court held that the
debtors could recover the setoff amounts because the date of
the setoff was the date the refund was authorized by the IRS
and not the last day of the prior taxable year.  In re
Hankerson, 133 B.R. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Pa .
1991) .
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
  ACTIONS AGAINST FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.
The plaintiffs obtained farm operating loans from the
FmHA  which accelerated the loans.  The plaintiff filed an
action against individual FmHA employees for breach of
promise, fraud and misrepresentation in actions beyond the
scope of their official duties.  The United States District
Attorney certified that the actions of the defendants were
within the scope of their official duties and moved to
substitute the United States as defendant and to dismiss the
case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.  The court held that the
certification did not result in an automatic substitution of
the United States but allowed judicial review based upon
contrary evidence presented by the plaintiff.  The court
upheld the substitution in this case because the plaintiff
failed to provide evidence controverting the certification.
Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir .
1991) .
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations adding Hawaii and New Mexico as brucellosis-
free states for the purposes of interstate shipments of
breeding swine.  57 Fed. Reg. 3926 (Feb. 3, 1992).
The APHIS has announced an interim rule amending the
cattle brucellosis regulation by changing the classification
of Mississippi from Class B to Class A status.  57 Fed.
Reg. 3717 (Jan. 31, 1992).
    PERISHABLE AGRIC. COMMODITIES ACT.
A creditor shipped tomatoes to the debtor who failed to
make payment for the tomatoes before filing for bankruptcy.
The seller ordered an employee to send a Notice of Intention
to Preserve Trust Benefits under PACA but provided no
other evidence that the notice was sent other than to state
that the notice would have been sent in the normal course of
business.  The court held that the seller did not sufficiently
comply with PACA notice requirements to preserve the
seller's interest in the PACA trust.  In re  East Coast
Brokers and Packers, Inc., 134 B.R. 41 (M.D.
Fla. 1991), aff'g , 120 B.R. 221 (Bankr. M . D .
Fla. 1990).
A creditor of a produce buyer argued that the proceeds of
the sales of the produce by the buyer were not subject to a
PACA trust for the persons who sold the produce to the
buyer because the sales to the buyer and by the buyer were
only intrastate sales.  The court held that because the sales
were part of the normal course of interstate movement of
such produce, 7 U.S.C. § 499a(8) applied to include the
proceeds within the PACA trust.  In re  Southland +
Keystone, 132 B.R. 632 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
RICE.  The CCC has adopted as final regulations
changing the announcement time of the adjusted world price
for rice to 7 a.m. on Tuesdays and calculating marketing
loan gains and loan deficiency payment rates based on
national average milling yields.  57 Fed. Reg. 4 5 4 3
(Feb. 6, 1992).
WHEAT.  The CCC has adopted as final regulations
establishing the 1992 acreage reduction for wheat at 5
percent.  57 Fed. Reg. 3921 (Feb. 3, 1992).
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The CCC has adopted as final regulations the rule that
1991 crop wheat may not be used for farmer-owned reserve
loans.  57 Fed. Reg. 3716 (Jan. 31, 1992).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
BELOW MARKET INTEREST RATE
LOANS.  The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in
Krabbenhoft v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991,
aff'g, 94 T.C. 887 (1990) (I.R.C. § 483 could not be used
as "safe harbor" interest rate for gift tax purposes for below
market interest rate loans).  See Vol 2, A.L.D. p. 148.
   CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. Under the irrevocable
trust provisions, the trust made annual payments to the
grantor equal to the lesser of trust income and 5 percent of
the net fair market value of the trust assets.  The remainder
of the trust was to be distributed to several charitable
organizations.  The grantor had the right to substitute
charitable remainder holders.  The IRS ruled that the trust
qualified as a charitable remainder unitrust with the value of
the trust at the taxpayer's death allowed as a charitable
deduction, but because the grantor could change charitable
remainder holders, no completed gift was made upon
establishment of the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9204036, Oct.
29, 1991.
A corporation transferred its shares of stock in another
corporation to a 20-year charitable remainder unitrust with
the corporation as beneficiary and charitable organizations as
remainder holders.  The IRS ruled that the corporation was a
permissable recipient of a charitable unitrust and the trust
qualified as a charitable unitrust.  Ltr. Rul. 9205031 ,
Nov. 5, 1991.
ESTATE FREEZES.  The IRS has adopted as final
regulations under the estate and gift tax valuation rules
governing valuation of retained interests in gifts.  Changes
from the proposed regulations, see Vol. 2, A.L.D. pp. 78,
174, include the following:
Under the proposed regulations, where a decedent has had
an "applicable retained interest" in a gift valued under the
special valuation rules of I.R.C. § 2701, the decedent's
estate is entitled to a non-refundable credit against the federal
estate tax, prior to application of the unified credit, equal to
the increase in the gift tax on the transfer resulting from the
special valuation.  The IRS has issued a revised proposed
regulation which, instead of a credit, reduces the decedent's
adjusted taxable gifts by the lesser of (1) the amount by
which the transferor's taxable gifts were increased by Section
2701 and (2) the increase in the decedent's gross estate or
adjusted taxable gifts attributable to the portion of the
applicable retained interest subject to gift tax.  Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-5.
The final regulations provide that a lapse of a liquidation
right occurring solely by reason of a change in state law is
not a lapse subject to Section 2704(a).
The amount of an individual's gift is determined using
the subtraction method of valuation.  Treas. Reg. §
25.2701-3(a).  The value of senior interests (including
applicable retained interests) is subtracted from the value of
the entire entity to determine the value of junior interests
such as common stock. Id.  The final regulations prescribe
a four step method for applying the subtraction method--
(1)  Determine the value of the family-held interests in
the corporation or partnership as if held by one person.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(1).   See Rev. R u l .
59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237; Rev. Rul. 83 -120 ,
1983-2 C.B. 170.  The valuation of the various classes
of equity interests must be made using a consistent set of
assumptions.
(2)  Reduce the value of the entity determined in the first
step by the sum of the fair market value of all senior equity
interests held by non-family members and by the sum of the
values of the family-held senior equity interests.  Treas.
Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(2).   A special adjustment is
provided in this step to avoid attributing value to a trans-
ferred interest that will not inure to equity interests held by
family members.
(3)  Reduce the amount determined in step 2 by the sum
of the fair market values of the family held junior equity
interests.  Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(3).
  (4) Adjust the amount determined in step 3 by giving
effect to appropriate adjustments to reflect fragmented
ownership, for example minority discounts and control
premiums.  Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(4).
The balance is then allocated among the transferred
interests and other interests of the same class or subordinate
classes held by the family. 57 Fed. Reg. 4250 (Feb.
4, 1992).
The taxpayer transferred two types of one class of
nonvoting preferred stock to a trust for the taxpayer's
children while retaining another type of preferred stock in
the same class, preferred stock in a different class and all
voting common stock.  The IRS ruled that the portion of
the different type but same class of preferred stock held by
the taxpayer was an applicable retained interest because the
taxpayer held voting control in the corporation and the
preferred stock had a distribution right which was a qualified
payment right.  Therefore, the gift of the other preferred
stock to the children's trust must be valued under I.R.C. §
2701.  The IRS also ruled that the other class of preferred
stock held by the taxpayer was not subject to Section 2701
because the stock was convertible only to nonvoting
common stock which was junior to the preferred stock
transferred to the trust.  The stock transferred to the
children's trust was valued under the three step subtraction
method as set forth in the proposed regulations.  Note: the
final regulations added a fourth step, see supra, which would
not have applied because all stock was held by family
members.  Ltr. Rul. 9204016, Oct. 24, 1991).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
In 1971, the grantor had established three separate but
identical, except for the beneficiary, trusts for the grantor's
children.  In July 1976, the grantor established an
irrevocable charitable lead trust with the three children as
remainder beneficiaries.  In November 1976, the grantor
established another charitable lead trust identical to the July
1976 trust except that the beneficiaries had a limited
testamentary power to appoint trust assets.  The
beneficiaries proposed to merge their respective remainder
trust interests into their own 1971 trusts with a provision
maintaining the testamentary limited power of appointment
over the assets from the November 1976 trusts.  The IRS
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ruled that the mergers would not subject the trusts to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9204043, Oct. 28, 1991.
    INCOME TAX. The decedent died before the decedent's
and surviving spouse's joint income tax return was filed.
The executor, the surviving spouse, did not file a claim for a
deduction for the decedent's portion of the income tax paid
by the surviving spouse until after an audit of the return.
The claim was also not presented in the state probate
proceedings.  The IRS ruled that the deduction was not
allowed because the claim was not valid under state law as
against the decedent's estate. Ltr. Rul. 9204006, Oct.
21, 1991.
    MARITAL DEDUCTION. In filing Form 706, the
executor claimed a marital deduction for a trust eligible as
QTIP and identified the trust but otherwise failed to properly
complete Schedule M.  The executor filed an amended
Schedule M which properly made the election and filed for
an extension of time to make the QTIP election.  The IRS
ruled that good cause and intent to originally make the
election were shown and the extension was granted. Ltr.
Rul. 9204002, Sept. 4, 1991; Ltr. R u l .
9205010, Oct. 31, 1991.
Although the decedent's will provided for a marital trust
which qualified for the marital deduction, the executor failed
to make the election on Form 706 and failed to submit a
schedule of marital bequest property on Schedule M.  The
executor filed an amended Schedule M which properly made
the election and filed for an extension of time to make the
QTIP election.  The IRS ruled that good cause and intent to
originally make the election were shown and the extension
was granted.  Ltr. Rul. 9204037, Oct. 29, 1991.
The taxpayer owned an interest in a profit sharing plan
with the taxpayer's spouse as beneficiary of any post-death
benefits.  The taxpayer established an intervivos trust with
the taxpayer and spouse as beneficiaries.  The trust was
made the beneficiary of the plan death benefits.  At the death
of the taxpayer, the trust was to be split into three trusts,
one which included one-half of the plan death benefits and
had the spouse as beneficiary with testamentary general
power of appointment over the trust corpus and a second
trust with the other half of the plan death benefits and the
spouse as beneficiary with testamentary power of
appointment of trust accrued and undistributed income.  The
IRS ruled that the plan death benefits were includible in the
taxpayer's gross estate and any value remaining in the plan
at the surviving spouse's death was includible in the
spouse's gross estate.  The death benefits were also QTIP
eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9204017 ,
Oct. 25, 1991.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  In filing Form
706, the executor failed to include appraisals substantiating
the fair market value of properties for which special use
valuation was elected and failed to include documentation of
the special use value claimed.  During an audit of the return,
the missing information was requested by the IRS but not
provided.  The information was not provided until after the
audit was closed and the executor filed a protest.  The IRS
ruled that an extension of time to file an amended election
was not granted because the executor failed to promptly
respond to deadlines.  Ltr. Rul. 9204005, Oct. 1 6 ,
1991 .
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ANNUITIES.  A trust was established with a deferred
annuity contract as part of the trust corpus and a person as a
beneficiary.  The trust provided for distribution of the
annuity contract to the beneficiary when the beneficiary
reached age 40, prior to the beginning of annuity payments.
The IRS ruled that for purposes of I.R.C. § 72(u)(1), the
annuity contract was considered held by the beneficiary.  In
addition, the IRS ruled that the transfer of the annuity
contract to the beneficiary at age 40 would not be considered
as an assignment without full and adequate consideration
under I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(C). Ltr. Rul. 9204010, Oct.
10, 1991.
ASSESSMENT .  The court held that the limitation
period for assessments against the partnership return applied
in determining the limitation period for assessing a tax
deficiency against a limited partner based on disallowance of
a partnership loss item.  Harvey v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1992-67.
BONUSES.  The taxpayer had a taxable year ending on
January 31 and paid employee bonuses the following July
and December, although the deduction for the bonuses was
made the previous taxable year.  The court held that the
deductions were allowable only in the taxable year paid
because the deferral of payment past the end of the taxable
year was too long and the taxpayer could have altered the
deferral method  Truck & Equip. Corp. v. Comm'r,
98 T.C. No. 12 (1992).
COOPERATIVES.  A non-exempt agricultural
cooperative had net operating losses from one of its
operations for a taxable year and sought carryback of the
losses to previous taxable years.  The carryback of the
losses also resulted in excess investment tax credits in those
years and the cooperative sought further carryback of those
credits at the cooperative level.  The court held that the
limitations of I.R.C. § 277 did not apply to non-exempt
cooperatives because the allowance of losses was
specifically controlled by Subchapter T.  The court also held
that the excess investment tax credits were to be passed to
the patrons of the cooperative under I.R.C. § 46(h).
Landmark, Inc. v. U.S., 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,058 (Cl. Ct. 1992).
HOBBY LOSSES .  The taxpayer, an dentist, was
allowed investment tax credit on a truck purchased for use
on a pecan farm where the farm was operated in a
professional manner, although the farm had not yet made a
profit.  Cole v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-251.
PENALTIES.  The taxpayers were assessed a penalty
for substantial understatement of tax, including
understatement of the taxpayers' self-employment tax.  The
taxpayers argued that the I.R.C. § 6661 penalty applied only
to "income" tax.  The court held that the legislative history
of the self-employment tax demonstrated that the self-
employment tax was to be treated the same as income tax
and allowed the penalty.  Cameron v. Comm'r, 9 8
T.C. No. 10 (1992).
AGRICULTURAL LAW DIGEST
P.O. BOX 5444
MADISON, WI 53705-5444
40
NEGLIGENCE
EMPLOYER'S DUTY.  The plaintiff was injured by
a falling tree limb while working for the defendant
removing dead tree limbs in a pecan grove.  The plaintiff
sued the defendant for failure to warn about the hazards of
removing the limbs.  The court held that the plaintiff, an
experienced pecan grove worker, knew or should have
known of the danger of failing limbs from pecan trees;
therefore, the defendant had no duty to warn of a condition
known to the plaintiff.  Richards v. Henderson, 5 8 9
So.2d 709 (Ala. 1991).
TRESPASS
TIMBER.  The defendant purchased timber land next to
land owned by the plaintiff.  Based on the previous owner's
erroneous designation of the boundary, the defendant ordered
third parties to cut timber on land which belonged to the
plaintiff.  The trial court awarded the plaintiff treble
damages based on the average of the appraisals of three
independent appraisers, under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 96 1/2, ¶
9402.  The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
statute as violating due process in mandating the damage
award to the average of the three appraisals.  The court held
that the statute was not unconstitutional and did not violate
due process because the defendant had the opportunity to
cross examine and rebut the appraisals.  Aaron v .
Hendrickson, 582 N.E.2d 759 (Ill. Ct. App.
1991) .
CITATION UPDATES
Echols v. Comm'r, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir .
1991), aff'g on reh'g , 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir .
1991), (bad debt) see p. 29 supra.
INTERNATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL LAW
CONFERENCE
"The Role of Law in an Agricultural Market Economy"
April 27-29, 1992, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.
The Agricultural Law Section of the Iowa State Bar
Association, the Center for International Agricultural
Finance and the American Agricultural Law Ass'n present a
conference with educators and lawyers from the United
States and the former Soviet Union.  For information,
contact: Gretchen Triplett, Coordinator, Center for Int'l Ag
Finance, 478 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames,
Iowa 50011-1070.
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